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Security Dictionary (Security)

A dictionary for looking up the key terms of 5GC security by meaning and usage. For the detailed flows, see the Authentication chapter / Security chapter.

Related: Authentication chapter / Security chapter / Identifier Dictionary / NF Dictionary


Authentication/key terms

Term Meaning Actor/Location Notes Spec
5G-AKA The 5G version of the AKA authentication scheme UE / AUSF / SEAF / UDM In addition to HRES verification (RES is generated on the UE side), the SEAF receives KSEAF and also handles key derivation from KAMF onward TS 33.501 §6.1.3.2
EAP-AKA' The AKA' authentication scheme on the EAP framework UE / AUSF / UDM EAP-based mutual authentication TS 33.501 §6.1.3.1 / RFC 5448
Authentication method selection Choosing between 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA' UDM/ARPF The UDM/ARPF decides TS 33.501 §6.1.2
KSEAF The top-level anchor key handed from AUSF to SEAF upon successful authentication AUSF→SEAF The top of the key hierarchy TS 33.501 §6.2
KAMF The key derived from KSEAF Held by the AMF Below KSEAF TS 33.501 §6.2
KNASint / KNASenc NAS integrity key / NAS ciphering key AMF・UE Derived from KAMF TS 33.501 §6.2
KgNB→KRRCint/KRRCenc/KUPint/KUPenc The various keys used on the AS side gNB・UE Derives the AS keys starting from KgNB, which is derived from KAMF TS 33.501 §6.2
SUCI / SUPI / SIDF The UDM's SIDF de-conceals the SUCI, which conceals the permanent identifier SUPI UE (conceal) / SIDF within UDM (de-conceal) For details see the Identifier Dictionary TS 33.501
ARPF Storage of the long-term key and generation of authentication vectors Within UDM Authentication Credential Repository and Processing Function TS 33.501

Algorithm/procedure terms

Term Meaning Actor/Location Notes Spec
NEA (NEA0/1/2/3) Ciphering algorithm NAS layer・AS layer Used for NAS/AS ciphering TS 33.501 §5.11
NIA (NIA0/1/2/3) Integrity protection algorithm NAS layer・AS layer NIA0 is limited to unauthenticated emergency calls TS 33.501 §5.11
NAS SMC (Security Mode Command) Security activation at the NAS layer AMF⇔UE Enables NAS ciphering and integrity protection TS 33.501 §6.7.2
AS SMC Security activation at the AS (radio) layer gNB⇔UE Enables AS ciphering and integrity protection TS 33.501 §6.7.4
UP integrity protection (KUPint) User-plane integrity protection gNB・UE Introduced in Rel-15, constraints relaxed in Rel-16 TS 33.501

Keys descend by hierarchy

Upon successful authentication the top-level KSEAF is determined, and it is progressively derived down to KAMF → the various NAS/AS keys (TS 33.501 §6.2). The permanent identifier SUPI is concealed over the air as SUCI, and the UDM's SIDF de-conceals it. For the flow of the procedure see the Authentication chapter; for the details of keys and protection see the Security chapter.

Diagram: key hierarchy tree

This puts the derivation relationships from the table above into a single tree. Lower keys are derived from higher keys, and the lower a key sits the narrower the scope (segment) it protects. The key point is that KAMF branches into the keys for NAS (terminated at the AMF) and KgNB, the starting point for AS (terminated at the gNB).

flowchart TB
    KSEAF["KSEAF
Top-level anchor key
(AUSF→SEAF on successful authentication)"] KAMF["KAMF
(held by the AMF)"] subgraph NAS["For NAS (terminated between UE ⇔ AMF)"] direction LR KNI["KNASint
NAS integrity"] KNE["KNASenc
NAS encryption"] end KGNB["KgNB
Starting point for AS
(to the gNB)"] subgraph AS["AS = for radio (terminated between UE ⇔ gNB)"] direction LR KRI["KRRCint
RRC integrity"] KRE["KRRCenc
RRC encryption"] KUI["KUPint
UP integrity"] KUE["KUPenc
UP encryption"] end KSEAF --> KAMF KAMF --> KNI KAMF --> KNE KAMF --> KGNB KGNB --> KRI KGNB --> KRE KGNB --> KUI KGNB --> KUE classDef anchor fill:#fde,stroke:#c69,stroke-width:2px; classDef nas fill:#eef,stroke:#66a; classDef as fill:#efe,stroke:#3a3; class KSEAF,KAMF anchor; class KNI,KNE nas; class KRI,KRE,KUI,KUE as;

How to read the diagram

From the top-level KSEAF (the anchor key handed from AUSF to SEAF upon successful authentication), KAMF is derived, and from there it splits into the NAS keys (KNASint / KNASenc) and KgNB, the starting point for AS. From KgNB, the various RRC and UP keys for the radio segment are further derived. NAS keys terminate at UE⇔AMF and AS keys at UE⇔gNB, and the lower a key sits the narrower the segment it protects. Thanks to this hierarchy, even if the key of one segment leaks, it is unlikely to propagate to higher keys or other segments. Note that derivations above KSEAF also exist (K →〔CK/IK〕→ KAUSF → KSEAF); for the full picture, see Security Advanced (level5).